ABSTRACT The detection and the reconstruction of actuator faults in a flight control system are crucial to avoid negative impacts on the aircraft itself, as well as human and environmental systems. In this paper, an actuator fault detection and reconstruction scheme based on fault classification for the hex-rotor unmanned aerial vehicle are designed. First, the fault type of actuator is analyzed and classified, then an actuator fault model is established based on multiple fault classification. Second, a fault detection and reconstruction (FDR) scheme for the hex-rotor unmanned aerial vehicle is proposed. In the proposed scheme, a fault observer group based on an extended Kalman filter (EKF) is designed for fault detection and isolation, and the flight state feedback required by the fault observer group is provided by the multi-sensor navigation unit (MSNU). Then, a fault reconstruction algorithm of the actuator is proposed by using the output of the fault observer group. The designed FDR system is applied to hex-rotor unmanned aerial vehicle prototype for its evaluation. The simulation results show that the proposed design is capable of fault detection and the reconstruction of actuator faults, and the actual flight verifies the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-rotor unmanned aerial vehicles (mUAV) have been extensive applied in military and civilian fields, including for security patrols, search and rescue in hazardous environment, surveillance and classification, attack, and rendezvous [1] , [2] . Consequently, the aircraft safety accidents caused by actuator faults have also increased dramatically all over the world, having negative impacts on human and environmental systems. Therefore, research into fault-tolerant control (FTC) technology for mUAV has become critical for improving the safety and reliability of mUAV [3] - [6] .
FTC technology, widely used in many fields of astronautics and aerospace [7] - [16] , can remove the influence of faults independently, and maintain the quality of the system. Generally, the FTC system of mUAV includes fault detection (FD) and control reconfiguration. FD is an important component in the construction of FTC systems for mUAV. FD in control problems of mUAV has received a great deal of attention in
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Maurizio Magarini. recent years [17] , [18] . Due to the fact that fault occurrence in aeronautical systems can lead to irreparable financial loss and injuries, early detection of faults plays an important role in a flight control system. In the case of fault occurrence in an actuator, the flying performance of mUAV may degrade, which may cause partial loss of the control action of the actuator. Thus, in order to have a safe flight controller, it is essential to compensate for the faults that occurred. Conventional approaches to fault detection in actuators are mainly based on hardware redundancy techniques. However, due to the limitations of size, weight, and cost in the design of mUAVs, hardware redundancy is not a feasible solution for the design of fault-tolerant systems for mUAVs. Therefore, the idea of analytical redundancy has been proposed as an alternative solution [19] - [23] . The majority of FD techniques in UAVs are based on observer and parameter estimation technology [24] - [26] . Some exciting results have been obtained using a sliding mode observer [27] - [29] , a two-stage Kalman filter [30] , an adaptive Thau observer [31] , and sliding mode techniques [32] . The passive fault tolerant control (PFTC) is proposed in [33] , [34] , which requires the fault estimation. VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ But this proposed approach becomes very difficult when a severe fault occurs. In order to deal with several classes of fault, the FTC based on the combination between backstepping control and adaptive interval type-2 fuzzy inference systems is given in [35] , and applied to the hexarotor and quadrotor helicopters. In this paper, according to the fault detection and reconstruction problem of the actuator, a lift model of actuator is built on the basis of fault occurrence. The actuator faults are divided into two categories, i.e. failure and gain fault. To perform quick and accurate detection of the fault of each actuator, and to determine the location and type of the fault, a set of fault observers (FOB) based on EKF is designed, combined with the state feedback of the mUAV provided by the multi-sensor navigation unit (MSNU). In addition, a self-reconfiguration algorithm based on fault classification is designed, which can be used to reconstruct the different actuator faults according to the output signal of the FOB, so as to ensure the safety and reliability of the flight. Based on the theoretical analysis, the related research is verified by numerical simulation and actual flight. In comparison with actuator fault detection and reconstruction design for mUAV in the existing literature, the main contributions of this research work are twofold. First, on the premise of in-depth analysis of the frequently occurring actuator fault types, a novel actuator lift model based on fault classification is developed. Secondly, a fault detection and reconstruction strategy based on actuator fault classification for the Hex-rotor UAV is proposed.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the fault model of actuator based on fault classification. Our proposed fault detection and reconstruction strategy is illustrated and the FDR design for the Hex-rotor UAV is presented in Section 3. The numerical simulation and experimental results are illustrated in Section 4. The conclusions are provided in Section 5.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. INTRODUCTION OF HEX-ROTOR UAV
As a kind of mUAV, the Hex-rotor UAV can improve the structure of conventional planar mUAV without significantly increasing the weight of the aircraft [36] . It can effectively improve the carrying capacity and flight endurance, and enhance the control moment of the yaw channel. The threedimensional structure diagram and structural principle of Hex-rotor UAV are shown in FIGURE 1(a) and FIGURE 1(b), respectively.
From the figures we know that the Hex-rotor UAV has symmetry. The six carbon fiber connecting rods are of equal length located on the same plane, and distributed around the center of the aircraft evenly. The six actuators are vertically installed at the end of the connecting rod, each of which consists of a motor and a rotor.
The physical parameters of the prototype are shown in TABLE 1. axis of the body coordinate system become angle γ (γ = 10 • ). The two adjacent motor axes point to the opposite direction. The two centrally symmetric rotors are in the same plane, such as rotors 1 and 4, rotors 2 and 5, and rotors 3 and 6. Depending on this novel layout structure, the aircraft can achieve arbitrary configuration of 6-DOF motion (within the range of the rotor's driving capacity) by adjusting the rotational speeds of the six actuators.
B. FAULT TYPE OF ACTUATOR
For the Hex-rotor UAV, more than 95% of the power is consumed by the actuators. Compared to other units of HexRotor UAV, due to the heavy workload, high temperature, mechanical vibration, and aging components, the actuator is more prone to failure. In addition, the number of actuators in the Hex-rotor UAV increases the probability of failure. Once the actuator has a failure, it often causes the aircraft to lose control or even crash. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the reliability of the actuator.
In this paper, the mentioned Hex-rotor UAV has six actuators. Each of them is composed of a three-phase brushless DC motor (BLDCM), a rotor, and a driving circuit board (as shown in FIGURE 2) . This section will analyze the lift fault model of the actuator in considering the conditions of the motor fault, the drive circuit board failure, and the rotor fault. It provides a theoretical basis for the design of the FDR system. 
1) THE DRIVE CIRCUIT BOARD FAULT
During the flight, the drive circuit board in the actuator has high load, high temperature, and fast aging of electronic components, which makes the failure rate of the drive circuit board high, and seriously threatens the safe flight of the aircraft. The main faults of the drive circuit board include open circuit fault, phase-changing fault, short circuit fault, etc.
a: OPEN CIRCUIT OF THREE-PHASE FULL CONTROL BRIDGE
The actuator adopts a three-phase full control bridge circuit to drive BLDCM. The full control bridge circuit is composed of power MOSFET and its driving circuit. In the absence of a fault, the output waveform of the terminal voltage is controlled by the modulated signal of fully control bridge. Taking the terminal voltage of phase A as an example, the output waveform diagram is shown in FIGURE 3. It can be seen that the terminal voltage is not only consistent with the modulated signal, but also the time interval between the six sectors in an electric cycle is uniform. In addition, with the increase of duty cycle, the electric cycle decreases and the speed of BLDCM increases. The terminal voltage waveform will no longer be consistent with the modulated signal when an open circuit occurs. In FIGURE 4, it is shown that the terminal voltage of the fault phase will be greatly distorted. Meanwhile, the speed will decrease. However, the time interval between the six sectors in an electric cycle will not be affected. In addition, after the occurrence of an open circuit of the full control bridge circuit, the drive circuit board cannot ensure that the reactive magnetic field produced by the circuit is perpendicular to the stator magnetic field, causing the output torque of the motor to be reduced. At this point, the BLDCM will be in a low efficiency running state and has excessive heat, which may develop into more serious faults such as the MOSFET breakdown short circuit fault, etc.
b: PHASE-CHANGING FAILURE
When phase-changing failure occurs, the driving circuit board cannot get the accurate signal of phase-changing, which leads to phase-changing failure. There are two cases of phasechanging, namely, the lag phase-changing and the forward phase-changing. As shown in FIGURE 5, the failure of both ways will make the time interval of the six sectors uneven. Phase-changing failure usually has a variety of reasons, such as switch noise of three-phase full control bridge circuit, the continuous current process of inductance of windings, etc. These reasons can cause the controllers to misjudge the phase-changing signal. Therefore, it is necessary to add the judgment process into the phase-changing algorithm of the controller. In the same way, the phase-changing failure also makes the efficiency of the motor lower.
c: MOSFET BREAKDOWN
Subject to the MOSFET package and the small position of assembly, in this case, the MOSFET temperature will rise rapidly, causing MOSFET to leave the safe operating area (SOA). Eventually, as shown in FIGURE 6, the MOSFET will enter the short-circuit state due to over-current breakdown. Under the condition of limited battery output power, this state may lead to a very serious drop in the bus voltage, so that the aircraft is completely out of control.
2) BLDCM FAULT
The BLDCM fault may cause a decrease or even disappearance of the induced electromotive force (EMF). According to the voltage balance equation of the BLDCM, as the induced EMF decreases, the armature current will inevitably increase. In this case, the heating of the BLDCM is serious and the operational efficiency is reduced, which further deteriorates the situation, and even causes the induced EMF to be close to zero.
When the induced EMF is reduced to zero, the supply voltage is applied directly to the equivalent resistance of the coil windings. As the equivalent resistance of the coil windings is very small, typically a few hundred milliohms, a tremendous amount of armature current is generated. The large armature current is most likely to cause breakdown of the MOSFET, resulting in the BLDCM burnout (as shown in FIGURE 7), which seriously compromises the system. In summary, the drive board fault and motor failure will make the actuator be in low efficiency operation, which will cause a serious breakdown if a short-circuit fault occurs. Therefore, for the entire flight system, the safest approach is to stop the corresponding actuator when a drive board fault or motor fault is detected, and upload the fault information to the operational layer to activate the self-reconfigurable controller.
3) ROTOR FAULT
In addition to the above two faults, the other type of fault is rotor failure. The rotor is an important element that provides lift for the Hex-Rotor UAV, but the rotor often appears to be loosening due to rotor damage, surface damage, severe wear at joints, etc., which leads to the possibility of rotor fault. Usually, on assuming that the rotor speed is constant, the rotor can provide a constant lift for the Hex-Rotor UAV. Once the rotor failure occurs, the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft are changed, and the lift force provided to the aircraft fluctuates. The lift force provided by the rotor is significantly reduced or even lost, which seriously affects the stability and safety of the Hex-Rotor UAV.
Based on the above analysis, the common faults of the actuator are summarized as follows. 
C. MODELING OF ACTUATOR BASED ON FAULT CLASSIFICATION
In this section, the impact of the fault on the actuator model is discussed. The faults are summarized in TABLE 2. Based on the discussion, the model of the actuator under the condition of fault is obtained.
Generally, the lift model provided by the actuator can be described as [37] :
where f is the lift force provided by the actuator, k is the factor of lift force, and varies with environmental parameters. is the rotor speed. As can be seen in Equation (1), the performance of the fault of the actuator is the change of the lift force (in other words, the change of the lift factor or the rotor speed). Naturally, the fault of the actuator can be divided into two cases, that is cannot reach the desired speed or k less than the normal value. In order to facilitate analysis, gain fault and failure are introduced to describe the cases.
The gain fault of the actuator is when lift factor k is smaller than the normal range. If the actuator can only provide partial lift force at the same speed, then the gain fault can be described as:
wherek i is the lift factor measured in the indoor standard atmospheric pressure, and i = 1, 2, 3 . . . , 6. i is the speed of the i-th rotor, and f i (t) indicates the actual lift force produced by the i-th actuator. β i is called the damage proportionality coefficient, and 0 < β i < 1. It can be seen that the larger β i is, the smaller the actual output of lift force of the rotor.
When rotor fault occurs, the lift factor is significantly smaller than the normal value. Although the motor and rotor can continue to work, the actuator can only provide partial lift. It can be seen that the rotor fault belongs to the gain fault of the actuator.
The failure of the actuator means that the actuator does not have the ability to provide lift force for the Hex-Rotor UAV in the working state. Then the failure can be described as:
When the BLDCM fault occurs in the actuator, its speed cannot reach the desired speed or even zero. If it is not handled in time, there is a risk of drive circuit board fault. Therefore, when the BLDCM fault is detected, the fault motor will stop working and the BLDCM fault can be attributed to the failure of the actuator.
The drive circuit board fault is similar to the BLDCM fault, and its speed cannot reach the desired speed or even zero. The driving circuit board fault is a type of electrical fault; it is very likely to deteriorate in a short time, and the serious danger is hidden. In order to avoid risks, the actuator of the fault will stop working. The driver circuit board failure is also attributed to the failure.
Based on the above discussion, the common faults of the actuator of Hex-Rotor UAV can be classified into two categories, namely gain fault and failure. The actuator model based on fault classification can be described as:
III. FAULT DETECTION AND RECONSTRUCTION (FDR) SYSTEM DESIGN
According to the fault classification of the actuator, a FDR system is designed as shown in FIGURE 8. It can be seen that the state transition matrix of the FOB and the control input matrix are obtained through the dynamic model of the aircraft, and the measurement matrix is obtained by the MSNU; then the lift factor of the rotor is estimated online. The FOB based on EKF estimates the lift factor of the corresponding actuator online by the estimated lift factor of the corresponding actuator and realizes the detection of failure and gain faults. When the actuator failure occurs, the corresponding self-reconfiguration algorithm for different faults can effectively guarantee the safety of the aircraft system. 
A. MULTI-SENSOR NAVIGATION UNIT
The FOB group needs the feedback of flight state by the fusion of MSNU, which consists of the microprocessor (STM32F103), the inertial measurement unit (IMU) (ADIS16448), and the GPS module (LEA-6H). The IMU includes a three-axes gyroscope, a three-axes accelerometer, a three-axes magnetometer, a pressure gauge, and a thermometer. The measurement data of each type of sensor have their own characteristics. For example, the Micro-ElectroMechanical System (MEMS) gyroscope has higher angular accuracy in the short term, but large cumulative errors and serious integration drift. At a constant speed of aircraft, using the accelerometer to solve the attitude angle does not cause the cumulative error problem, but the data accuracy is poorer. In this case, the data of the two sensors are fused by a Kalman filter (KF) to increase the estimation accuracy of the attitude angle. The data fusion flow of MSNU is shown in FIGURE 9.
As shown in FIGURE 9, if the IMU obtains the data of the three-axes gyroscope, three-axes accelerometer, and threeaxes magnetometer, thenφ,θ ,ψ and z φ , z θ , z ψ are obtained by the mechanical arrangement [37] . Next, the aircraft attitude angular data fusion process can be treated as a linear equation, and the state equation and measurement equation are obtained as follows:
where
T is the observation sequence, the three-dimensional system process noise sequence is Q η = [w φ , w θ , w ψ ] T , in which w φ , w θ , w ψ is determined by the gyroscope's own performance and subsequent processing, and the three-dimensional noise sequence
In the same way, relative to the space position and the line velocity, the equation of state and the measurement equation of the KF are as follows:
where, In this paper, the process noise is regarded as a fixed constant, and the observation noise is estimated by the Sage-Husa adaptive algorithm [38] in real time. The steps are as follows:
Among them, v k is the difference between the measured value and the predicted value of the residuals. P k/k−1 is the predicted covariance matrix. 
B. FAULT OBSERVER BASED ON EKF
According to the structural characteristics of the Hex-Rotor UAV, ignoring the influence of the torsional moment on control torque of the roll and pitch channel, the inertia moment of the rotor is also ignored. If each rotor's speed is regarded as an input of the dynamic model of the Hex-Rotor UAV, then the dynamic model of Hex-Rotor UAV is as follows [37] :
where η = φ ,θ ,ψ T is the Euler angular velocity, ω = [p, q, r] T is the angular velocity of the aircraft rotating around each axis relative to the body coordinate system, and T is the rotation velocity to the Euler angular velocity matrix in the body coordinate system, and
S is the rotation matrix of body coordinate system relative to inertial coordinate system, and S(ω) = 
where f (X, U) is a nonlinear function set of state vector and control input vector. W is a zero mean random noise vector. V is an observation noise vector. 
where G represents the local gravity acceleration.
Equations (14) equation (15) are discretized, and the Taylor expansion is used to linearize:
. Z k comes from the measurement of the gyroscope and accelerometer, and T s is the sampling interval. The discrete transfer matrix is k,k−1 = κ 6×6 + F k T s , and κ 6×6 = diag (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). F k can be solved by the following formula:
k,k−1 is the discrete control input matrix, and (20), as shown at the top of the next page, where χ i =k Li k i . The lift factor k i is included in the state vector, and the state vector of the augmented fault observer is as follows:
The state equation of the augmented state vectorX i is as follows:
Among them, the augmented discrete transfer matrix is:
(j) k,k−1 is the j-th column of controls input matrix k,k−1 . The augmented control input matrix is:
(0,j) k,k−1 is the j-th column of controls input matrix k,k−1 :
Using the s-weighted attenuation memory KF algorithm [39] , the failure observer of thei-th actuator is obtained: 
According to the second order norm of the fault observer residual vector, we can tell whether the current observation value k is accurate. If the second order norm of the residual vector is less than some constant in a period of time, the current estimate of the lift factork i can be considered accurate. Then the damage ratio coefficient β i of the actuator is obtained as follows:
where lift factork i is estimated by the fault observer, the lift factork i is measured at the standard atmospheric pressure indoors. Finally, the self-reconfigurable controller will determine whether the current actuator has no fault occurrence according to the value of β i . The self-reconfigurable controller is used when a fault occurs, and the related parameters in the controller are corrected when there is no fault.
C. SELF-RECONFIGURABLE CONTROLLER DESIGN
The self-reconfigurable controller will decide whether the current actuator is malfunctioning or what the type of fault is according to the value of β i , making the corresponding faulttolerant reconstruction when there is a fault, and modifying the relevant parameters in the controller when there is no fault. From the observation information provided by the FDR system, the β i of each rotor is known. The damage ratio coefficient matrix β is described as:
The matrix β indicates the degree of variation of the lift factork i estimated by the fault observer group and the variation of the lift factork i measured at atmospheric pressure.
Considering that the aircraft is usually in a small angular motion state, the rate of change of attitude angleη is approximately equal to the angular velocity ω of the aircraft, namely T ≈ diag (1, 1, 1) . With the combination of Equation (28), the attitude control model of the aircraft in fault conditions can be described as:
where, K β = β ·K,K is the matrix which composed of lift factors measured at indoor standard atmospheric pressure, Taking actuator 1 as an example, other actuator processes proceed in a similar way. Assuming that there is a gain fault in actuator 1, the pseudo-inverse algorithm is used to solve the desired rotational speed of the rotor, that is:
where B 4×6 is an augmented matrix of the control input matrix B. (32) , as shown at the top of the next page. 
According to Equation (31), the desired rotation speed of each rotor
T can be obtained. When rotor 1 is unable to achieve the desired speed 2 1.d , it can only maintain its maximum speed 1 . This shows that the lift provided by rotor 1 decreases, so the lift factor k 1 of rotor 1 in the prototype is reduced. At this moment, the equivalent lift factork 1 is:k
When β 1 increases,k 1 will decrease. This will affect the stability of the system by increasing the deviation of the lifting factor matrixK of the controller and the lifting factor matrixK = diag k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k 6 of the rotor. The criterion can be given as [36] :
T represents the design parameters of the sliding mode controller.
If the self-reconfigurable controller activated by the gain fault does not satisfy the criterion given by Equation (34), it is considered that the attitude angle control of the aircraft may be unstable, and the corresponding fault actuator will stop working. The processing mode of failure is adopted.
Assuming that a failure occurs in actuator 1, actuator 1 will not generate any lift (β 1 = 1). At this time, the control input matrix B 4×6 is singular. Reducing the order of B 4×6 for a 4×5 matrix B 4×5 , and introducing the relevant parameters of TABLE 1, the pseudo-inverse matrix (B 4×5 ) −1 is given as: Equation (35) indicates that the desired speed of actuator 4 is very small and may be negative. We change the control input matrix B 4×6 to a 3 × 5 matrix B 3×5 , whose pseudoinverse matrix (B 3×5 ) −1 is:
The control input matrix B 3×5 is:
Equation (37) indicates that the asymmetry of the pitch channel and roll channel will lead to the divergence of the controller. Therefore, the coordinate transformation of the Hex-Rotor UAV is needed to redefine the body coordinate system. The coordinate transformation method is as follows: the O b x b axis coincides with the connecting rod of actuator 1, pointing outward to be positive. The O b z b axis remains the same. The O b y b axis and the remaining two axes form the right-hand rectangular coordinate system, The control input matrix after coordinate transformation is described as follows:
The inversion sliding mode controller designed for attitude stability control is as follows:
where A (1) , C (1) , H (1) represent the reduced order matrix.
, t represents the reduced order vector. VOLUME 7, 2019
is the feedback after coordinate transformation and in descending order. Defining state variables Z (1) = [z (1).2 , z (1) .1 ] T proceeds as follows:
where, Q, N, K (1)K −1
(1) , and k i , as shown at the bottom of this page.
The matrix
, we have:
Through Equations (41) and (42), it is proven that
−1 H (1) must be positive and definite. It can be further obtained:
According to the LaSalle invariance theorem, wheṅ V 2 ≡ 0, and then z (1) ≡ 0, σ (1) ≡ 0. when t → ∞, we have z (1) → ∞, σ (1) → ∞. So the system tracking error z (1) .1 → 0, z (1) .2 → 0. The accuracy of tracking depends on the real-time estimation accuracy of each rotor lifting factor k i .
The stability of the closed-loop system under the selfreconfigurable control strategy, That is, the stability of the reconfigured dynamic inverse controller. Generally, the closed-loop transfer function of the imperfect dynamic inversion controller can be expressed as follows:
Considering that the aircraft is usually in a small angle motion state, it is considered that the attitude angle change rateη is approximately equal to the angular velocity ω of the aircraft. The linearized attitude rotation dynamic model of the Hex-Rotor UAV is obtained, that is:
Among them, A and B are respectively state transition matrix and control input matrix.
Define
.
a: STABILITY PROOF AFTER GAIN FAULT OCCURS
Assuming that the gain fault occurs in actuator 1, the following results are obtained in (45), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Because the lifting factor with the same parameters is used to extend the Kalman observer, It can be considered that, at the same time, the relative error of lifting factor estimation of no fault actuator is similar to that of lifting factor estimation of fault actuator, that is,
Combined with equation (44), the input matrix can be simplified to be expressed as:
(1) (B 3×5 ) −1 H (1) ,
Further, B DI A is obtained, that is,
According to the analysis in section 5.3 of reference [37] , the controller converges steadily in this case.
b: STABILITY PROOF AFTER FAILURE OCCURS
Assuming that the failure occurs in actuator 1, the following results are obtained:
Due to the structural characteristics of Hex-Rotor UAV, it can be considered that I x − I y ≈ 0. The elements of the first column and the second column of the third row are treated as zero. Similarly, according to the analysis in section 5.3 of reference [37] , the controller converges steadily in this case.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND FLIGHT EXPERIMENT
In this section, the FOB based on EKF is verified by numerical simulation. In order to speed up the convergence speed of the FOB, the s-weighted attenuation memory parameter is added. Which indicates that the weight of the observation value is increased in the filter equation. Conversely, the weight of the observed value in the filter equation is reduced. However, the s-weighted attenuation memory parameter will lead to a large number of burrs of the observed values, and therefore, the value of the s parameter should be considered comprehensively.
The influence experiment of s-weighted attenuation memory parameters on the lift factor was investigated, and the value of s parameter was reasonably selected. The experimental results are shown in FIGURE 12.
Suppose the lift factor specified in the aircraft (red, blue, and green curves) and the actual lift factor curve (black) has a certain error, the FOB estimate lift factor since 0.06 s. In FIGURE 12, the result shows that when s = 1.0, the lifting factor tracking curve is smooth, but the convergence rate is slow (about 0.2 s). At the time of s = 1.08, the lift factor tracking curve has more burr, but the convergence rate was fast (about 0.05 s). Although the tracking speed is fast, in the actual system, due to the influence of the sensor noise, its burr is also large and the measurement accuracy is low. According to the above analysis, the weighted attenuation memory parameter s = 1.04 is adopted.
The simulation verifies that the lift factor observer group can simultaneously estimate the lifting factor for all the actuators. The simulation background is that the Hex-Rotor UAV is in flight state, and the lift factor in the controller is about 15% error. The experimental results are shown in FIGURE 13. As can be seen from FIGURE 13, the fault observer is activated at 0.03 s, and the lift factor of each actuator estimated by the fault observer is close to the set value. The fault observer group designed in this paper can accurately track the lift factor of each actuator.
Next, the effectiveness of the FOB in the actuator of sudden fault and gradual fault is verified. The experimental results are shown in FIGURE 14. FIGURE 14 shows that actuator 2 has a sudden fault at about 0.1 s, its lift factor fell by about 25%, actuator 2 with fault is located accurately, the value of the lift factor is also estimated by the FOB. In addition, actuator 5 has a gradual fault at about 0.1 s, and the lift factor is decreased at a certain rate. The FOB determines the location of the fault actuator and tracks the lift factors accurately. To sum up, the fault isolation (confirm fault location) and the fault identification (fault size) can be implemented by the designed FOB group. It monitors the health of all actuators of the Hex-Rotor UAV, which provides a solid foundation for the self-reconfigurable controller.
This section will test the stability and control effect of the self-reconfigurable controller in the actual flight of the prototype, as shown in FIGURE 15. The design of the selfreconfigurable controller is based on the sliding mode control method. In the case of gain fault of the actuator, according to equation (34) , controller parameters are selected. And in the case of actuator failure, a failure occurs, the controller parameters can be obtained by equation (43) . First, the flight experiment of the gain fault of the actuator is carried out. The experimental environment is outdoors, and the wind speed is about 3.2-4 m/s, in the southeast direction. After a gain fault occurs, the lift factor of the actuator decreases, but the effect The results show that actuator 6 has a gain fault around 1.9 s (the lift factor is about 70% of normal value). In FIGURE 16, the red curve is the given value of the attitude angle, the black curve is the actual tracking curve of the attitude angle. It can be seen that the self-reconfigurable controller completes the controller reconstruction through 0.4 s, and restores the attitude angle stability. The controller has certain maneuvering ability and control quality. According to the above analysis, after the gain fault occurs, the stability of the attitude control of the aircraft is guaranteed by the self-reconfigurable controller. The reliability of the aircraft is improved.
Next, the flight experiment of the failure of the actuator is carried out, and the experimental environment is the same as before. After the failure occurs, the actuator completely loses the driving force, and the control input matrix will change. In order to ensure the safety of the aircraft, it is necessary to abandon the control of the yaw angle, and only control the pitch angle, roll angle, and flight height. The experimental results are shown in FIGURE 17.
In FIGURE 17 , the red curve is the given value of the roll and pitch angles; the black curve is the actual tracking curve of the attitude angle. FIGURE 17(a) shows that actuator 5 has a failure at 3.5 s, and a complete loss of driving force. This leads to a peak value of 12 • appearing on the roll channel in the prototype. At this point, the aircraft is in danger of instability, and the self-reconfigurable controller finally completes the stability control of the roll angle. FIGURE 17(b) shows that actuator 5 does not participate in the control of the pitch angle, but the control effect of the pitch angle decreases due to the coupling relation of the nonlinear system. The experiment proves that the self-reconfigurable controller can guarantee the overall safety of the aircraft.
In order to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, a comparative experiment with the traditional sliding mode observer method under actuator conditions is carried out. The comparison results of attitude angle tracking are shown in Figure 18 . The black curve is the desired roll angle, the red curve is obtained by using the method presented in this paper, and the blue is curve is obtained by using the conventional method. Form the Figure 18 , the conventional method can track the desired roll angle. However, the tracking effect is not ideal, and there are large tracking error. By comparison, the proposed method can track the desired roll angle more accurate, and the tracking error is small. The statistical analysis comprising of mean and standard deviation values of the tracking error corresponding to both the conventional method and the proposed FDR schemes are gathered in TABLE 3.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The construction of fast and accurate fault detection and reconstruction is part of the FTC of an unmanned aerial vehicle system and guarantees safe flight in fault conditions. In this paper, fault detection and reconstruction were designed for a Hex-rotor UAV, and a fault detection and reconstruction algorithm based on multi-fault classification was designed. The numerical simulation results show that the designed fault detector set can accurately estimate and track each actuator lift factor and can quickly detect the fault location and type and achieve fault isolation. The actual flight experiment results of the prototype aircraft show that the reconfiguration controller can guarantee the attitude control stability and control quality of the Hex-Rotor UAV after the gain fault and failure occurred in actuator, and effectively improve the reliability, and security of the aircraft.
